"Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules? by Clark, Charles E.
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*CHARLms E. CLARK
A request to contribute to a memorial review in honor of
Robert M. Hunter is for me a must. Bob Hunter was a rare person,
one of the most completely free spirits I have ever known. Gay,
witty, high-spirited, his gentleness belied the force which was in
him, for no man stood firmer for principles of personal liberty;
none showed more courage and independence. In an age when
sterile conformity, if not abject fear, must be the rule, it is good
to recall someone who stood out against the trend. We shall miss
him grievously. The loss of his high capabilities, his moral strength,
and his capacity for leadership, in times when those qualities have
become priceless, is hard to bear. Even though my daily preoccu-
pations have made it impossible for me to frame a composition
worthy of a place in his honor, I feel that I must give what I can.
So I have turned to a portion of my daily task, thinking that such
an ordinary course would appeal to his modest approach to things
scholastic. And immediately I am confronted, in work for the Ad-
visory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with
a problem in his own field of procedural law which I think would
have intrigued him greatly. Accordingly I present this small offer-
ing in tribute to the memory of a fine scholar and a gallant gentle-
man.
The question has arisen in connection with current activities
of the Advisory Committee in surveying the rules to see if amend-
ments are desirable at this time.' It stems rather paradoxically from
the great success of the rules. Does the spread of the federal system,
particularly among the states, demand the conclusion that it should
not be disturbed, that hereafter changes should be made only for
the most compelling of reasons? It is obvious that, just as in the
similar case of changes later adopted in the uniform commercial
acts, there will be a substantial, if not permanent, lag before such
changes make their way into jurisdictions which have already
adopted existing rules. Does the ideal of uniformity suggest a
minimum of further change? And will the fact of change suggest
unsubstantiality, militating perhaps against further rapid adoptions
of the system? A difference of opinion as to the frequency of resort
to the amending process appears to be developing among rule
makers; the problem presented is one deserving of careful exam-
ination.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
1The pending activities of the Committee are stated in an announcement,
The United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee, 39 A.B.A.J. 754 (1953).
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Let us first place the matter in proper perspective. The proc-
ess of rulemaking, as experience has conditioned it, is one requir-
ing careful preliminary study and precise execution over a number
of years. The now customary, but wholly desirable, course of sub-
mitting the rules for substantial preliminary public discussion, a
course which has achieved the confidence of the profession for the
rulemaking process,2 is itself time consuming. The civil rules have
now been in effect for fifteen years. Only on four occasions have
amendments been adopted; of these, two were purely formal, one
added another procedural process- condemnation of property-
and only one revision, that effective March 19, 1948, affected any
substantial number of existing rules.3 As to that revision, more than
six years elapsed from the start of work by the Advisory Commit-
tee early in 1942 to its effective date.4 Obviously under the circum-
stances the amending process will operate with comparative in-
frequency. In actual experience, the problem, while recurring, will
not recur too often.
How many states or territories may be affected by such
changes? The number, it must be conceded at once, is already sub-
stantial and is likely to increase. With the addition of Nevada,
January 1, and Kentucky, July 1, 1953, to the list, there are now
just short of a dozen jurisdictions fully subject to the federal
scheme. They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Utah, and, for
2 Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules, 22 A.B.A-J. 787
(1936); Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District
Courts, 24 AB.A.J. 97,98 (1938). The history of the various drafts submitted for
consideration of the bench and bar is recounted in CrAR, CODE PLEADiIG 36-39,
45 (2d ed. 1947); Mooas's Cor=NARY oN THE U. S. JuDmcI CoDE 4, 5, 13, 18,
21-24 (1949); MooRE's FERAL RuLEs Am Ormcm FoRms 5, 6, 13, 17, 19-22
(1951). See also PRELn=ARY DRArr or Ruim or CivIr PROCEDURE viii, xix
(May 1936); RPORT OF Ti= ADvsoRY CoLnuTrru vi (April 1937); REPoRT OF
PROPOSED A mEiNs-Ts iii (June 1946); SuPPIIm aTARY REPORT OF PROPOSED
RULE TO GoVERN CoNDmrnAoN CAsES 1-8 (March 1951); and RmorT iii, iv
(May 1948).
3 An amendment of December 28, 1939, effective April 3, 1941, made the
rules applicable to proceedings for enforcement or review of compensation
orders under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and
incidentally established the power to amend; an amendment of December
31, 1948, effective October 20, 1949, made changes of name and citation re-
quired by the revision by Congress of Title 28, U=D STAxES CoDE, the former
Judicial Cede; and an amendment of April 30, 1951, effective August 1, 1951,
added RuIn 71A, "Condemnation of Property" - discussed by the writer in
The Proposed Condemnation Rule, 10 OHIo ST. L. J. 1 (1949). The other
and more extensive revision of December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948,
is referred to in the text. For the history of these amendments see the
texts by the writer and by Professor Moore cited in note 2 supra.




courts of law, Delaware. Substantial portions of the practice, no-
tably the discovery section, and to a lesser extent that of party-
joinder, have been taken over in several states; these include Flori-
da, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. Individual rules have been
adopted in other states, such as California, Connecticut, and North
Dakota. Still more widely adopted is Fed. Rule 16, the rule for pre-
trial conferences.5 Of the states considering the adoption of the rules
as the basic provision for local practice, perhaps Louisiana is farth-
est along, although there is a strong movement in California, and
at least some consideration to the cause in West Virginia and
Wyoming and perhaps Connecticut. 6
It may be well to note what has happened so far to the federal
amendments in state practice. To date there is no definite practice,
which may suggest opposite conclusions: since the pattern is al-
ready diverse, (a) it should not be made more so or (b) it is fool-
ish to try now to change it. In Colorado alone does there seem a
definite meeting of the issue; there the rules were amended in 1951
to include the federal amendments. 7 In Puerto Rico a commission
is at work to present suggestions along similar lines.8 In other juris-
S Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 909, 910 (1953); Clark, The Federal Rules in State Practice, 23 Rocny
MT. L. R EV. 520 (1951); Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform,
13 LAw & CoNTssn. PROB. 144 (1948); Clark, Code Pleading and Practice To-
day, in DAvm DUDLEY F=EL C i ARy EssAYs 55, 67-70 (1949); and see
passim, VAIERB.T, MUnMM STAuDMS OF JuDICIAL Amm-srAToI (1949).
Many of these state rules are separately printed; thus the recent Delaware,
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Utah rules are locally published, while those of
Minnesota and Nevada are published by the West Publishing Company.
6 McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LA. L. REv. 369
(1953); Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana System of Fact
Pleading; Expose des Motifs, 13 id. 395 (1953); Goodman, Should California
Adopt Federal Civil Procedure? 40 CAIn. L. REV. 192 (1952); Lugar, Com-
mon Law Pleading Modified versus Federal Rules, 52 W. VA. L. REv. 137, 53
id. 27, 142 (1950, 1951); Trelease, A Proposal for Wyoming Procedural Reform,
1 WYo. L. J. 45 (1947); Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Courts of
Record of the State of Wyoming, 2 Wyo. L. J. 124-241 (1948). In Connec-
ticut, where proposals of court reform have been pending since 1949, see
Clark & Clark, Court Integration in Connecticut: A Case Study of Steps in
Judicial Reform, 59 YALE L. J. 1395 (1950), and current numbers of the CoN-
cICUT BAR JouRNAL from 1950, the legislature has at long length passed
a bill conferring rulemaking authority on the courts. CoNN. PuBsIc ACT No.
214, Session, 1953.
7 23 RocKY MT. L. REv. 500-519 (1951).
8 Clark & Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive
Court Reorganization, 61 YAL= L. J. 1147, 1167, 1168 (1952); Snyder, New
Puerto Rico Judicial System Is Modern and Efficient, 36 J. A.m. Jum. Soc. 134
(1953). Rather curiously a legislative restriction on rulemaking prevented
court adoption of amendments to the rules of 1943 from 1948 to 1952, Clark
1953)
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dictions, it would appear that the rules adopted are the latest form
of the federal rules; thus Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Jersey, and Utah all have the latest form because that was the
case at the time of state adoption. In fact several of these jurisdic-
tions have in effect federal amendments recommended by the Ad-
visory Committee, but not adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States. This is notably the case with respect to the rule as to
the "lawyer's work product"; the rule thus in effect in these states
is somewhat broader in scope, and thus more restrictive of discov-
ery, than the rule announced by the Supreme Court in the cele-
brated Hickman case.9
What is the nature of amendments we thus consider? It seems
to the writer that a sharp distinction should be drawn between
those which are intended only to make more clear what was origi-
nally intended. The former mark a change in direction and ap-
proach; it might properly be that those other jurisdictions which
have accepted the implied invitation to take part in the movement
should desirably have some share in any substantial change in poli-
cy. No such change has actually been contempulated by the Advis-
ory Committee. The success of the rules and the spirit in which they
have been accepted by the profession would make such a shift in
any event of doubtful worth.'0 But the process of judicial interpre-
tation is sure to bring interpretations of the rules which in process
of time mark a departure, usually by slow degrees, from the original
intent of the rules. It is the nature of all procedure to harden and
solidify, to become increasingly "red tape."" That is at once the ad-
& Rogers, supra, 61 YALE L. I, at 1161 n. 53 (1952); Clark, Experience under
the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 495, 504,
reprinted in FEDmL Rurm or CiVIm PRocEURE AND Nnw TrrL 28, U. S. CODE
JuDIciAy AiND JuDiciAL PIocmuP 1, 10 (Rev. ed 1953).
9 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), was pending when the Advisory
Committee made its report recommending an amendment of RULE 30 (b)
which would have extended the protection of work products to the adverse
party, his surety, indemnitor, agent, or expert, as well as his attorney. See
RoEPORT OF PROPosED mENDMENTs 39-47 (June 1946) supra note 2. The Com-
mittee's unadopted note has been taken as a model in Ky. R.C.P. 37.02; LA.
RV. STAT. 13:3762 (1950); Mim. R.C.P. 26.02; NEV. R.C.P. 30(b); N.J. R.C.P.
3:26-2; PA. R.C.P. 4011(e); UTAH R.C.P. 30(b); WAs,,. RuLE or PLxADInG,
PRAcrIc AND PRocEDuRu 26 (a).
10 The success of the rules is now so thoroughly recognized as to be an
old story. In addition to the flattery of imitation, certain noteworthy encomia
are cited in Clark, The Federal Rules in State Practice, supra note 5, 23
Rocxv MT. L. REV. at 525 (1951); Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the
Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and A Protest, 1 SYRAcusE L. REV. 346, 349
(1950).
11 See section headings, pages 31 and 37, of HEPBuRN, THE HisToRicAL DE-
VELOPMENT OF CODE PLMDING (1897): "The inveterate nature of the incongruity
between procedure and substantive law- (1) The former petrifies while the
[Vol. 14
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vantage and the vice of routine. It becomes known, usable, and con-
venient it also becomes unchangeable, artificial, and square-corner-
ed. The process is the more striking in legal procedure because of
the inveterate way in which all legal trends are shaped or misshap-
ed by precedent. By what I have ventured to call a Gresham's Law
of Procedural Precedents, 12 the technical and the strict in due course
drives out the liberal and flexilIe. The latter is not striking; in-
deed, it may never be written into a formal opinion. For what the
trial judge lets the litigant or his counsel do, and the appellate
court permits, is not something to stimulate a legal opinion in any
of the famous Cardozo styles - ranging from "magisterial or im-
perative" to "tonsorial or agglutinative."'13 But a restrictive opinion
finding some grievous fault in the methods of justice is different.
In an attitude ranging from defiant virtue to sad reproof, it will
exude limiting mandates and technical precepts which expand as
they ripple down through later cases and trial court rulings.14 It
is these glosses which may properly stimulate clarifying amend-
ments returning the practice to the rules.
Certain examples will show the contrast I am suggesting. Some
distinguished lawyers of the Ninth Circuit Conference, being con-
cerned by what they consider a trend toward, or acceptance of,
"notice pleading," are supporting a movement to add "the facts
constituting the cause of action" to the requirements of statement
in a federal complaint.' 5 From the proponents' standpoint this could
be only a clarifying amendment. But actually they have misunder-
stood the background and purpose of the federal provision - "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief" - and, it is believed, the real accomplishment of
the rules. There never was any purpose or program to adopt or ad-
vance notice pleading, in spite of a later occasional loose judicial
epigram; this is demonstrated not merely by the history of the
drafting and the rules themselves, but, beyond question, by the
latter is in its budding growth. (2) The conservatism of the lawyer pre-
serves the incongruity."12 Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 VAxD. L. Rav. 493, 498 (1950). See also Cru, CODB PLMADING 71
(2d ed. 1947), discussing "procedural particularism."
13 CAUOZO, LAW AMD IMMs 10 (1931).
14A prime example is the present tendency of district judges to deny
summarily motions for summary judgment presenting more than issues of
law. See references note 32 infra and accompanying text. Of course the in-
sidious appeal of a quick way of apparently clearing congested calendars
cannot be overlooked as a cause of expanding influence of restrictive prece-
dents; see reference to procedural particularism, note 12 supra
Is See Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253-279, also McCaskill, The
Modern Philosophy of Pleading, 38 A.B.AJ. 123 (1952), and Tucker, supra note
6, with reply by McMahon to the Tucker argument, supra note 6.
1953]
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forms attached to the rules. The purpose was rather to get away
from the welter of details required in some jurisdictions and to fol-
low the more generalized statements of some states and, also, of the
general (as distinguished from the special) pleading of the com-
mon law.16 The various rules all intermesh to this end; the com-
plaint rule is not necessarily the most important, but others carry
forward the idea. These include the rules supporting general plead-
ing, limiting the nature of objections to pleadings, providing for
amendments requiring plain error for reversal, for discovery, pre-
trial, and summary judgment (aimed at quick reaching of the
merits, whatever the formal pleadings), and, especially important,
the Appendix of Forms. 7 The precedents show a noticeable carry-
ing out of this intent, with quite a minimum of operation of the
Gresham's Law, perhaps because the rule here is broadly permis-
sive, rather than restrictive.' 8 And so a proposed change which
might seem only clarifying turns out, when understood, to involve
a major reversal in purpose and intent, affecting a large part of the
total structure of the rules. In fact, if the correlative rules just
1 6 Thus the famous Federal Form 9, "Complaint for Negligence," taken from
MAss. Gssx. LAws c. 231, § 147, p. 2892 (1932), is the common declaration in
trespass on the case. Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848
(C.P. 1833); Reichwein v. United Electric Rys., 68 RIL 365, 27 A.2d 845 (1942),
quoting the declaration in 2 CH=TY, PLEADinG 574 (16th Am. ed.). See also
Federal Forms 4-8 and the "common counts"; Cook, "Facts" and "Statements
of Fact," 4 U. or CHr. L. REv. 233, 245 (1937); Notes, 30 CALWF. L. Rsv. 585 (1942)
and 4 id. 352 (1916); CiAaK, COD. PLPADnTG 287-296 (2d ed. 1947).17 Involved, in addition to RuLE 8(a), are at least RuLEs 8(b) to (f), 9,
10, 12(b) to (h), 15(b), 16, 26-37, 56, 61, and the Appendix of Forms.
18 They are too many to cite; collections may be found in the texts on
the FEmAL RULEs. Some representative examples appear in CLAR, CoDE
PLEADING 241-245 (2d ed. 1947). Among most recent cases, note Des Isles v.
Evans, 200 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1952); Selby Mfg. Co. v. Grandahl, 200 F.2d
932 (2d Cir. 1952); Phillips & Benjamin Co. v. Ratner, 2d Cir., Aug. 7, 1953;
Bloombury Woolen Co. v. Moosehead Woolen Mills, 109 F.Supp. 804 (D.Me.
1953); and in state decisions, Reese v. De Mund, 74 Ariz. 140, 245 P.2d 284, 287
(1952); Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 (1950); Klein v.
Sunbeam Corp., 94 A.2d 385 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952). It is difficult to find
cases squarely opposed; Bush v. Skidis, 8 F.R.D. 561 (E.D.Mo. 1948), ap-
pears to stand substantially alone in federal practice. Compare Grobart v.
Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, 2 N.J. 136, 65 A.2d 833 (1949),
and Zabady v. Frame, 22 N.J. Super. 68, 91 A.2d 643 (1952), commented on
by the writer in Book Review, 62 YALE L. J. 292, 297 (1953). The motion
calendars of the trial courts indicate a like smooth operation of the rule.
Thus the long motion calendars in the Southern District of New York are
practically devoid of motions to perfect the pleadings; and the same is
true, oddly enough, of the calendars in the Southern District of California at
Los Angeles, where, although the judges are divided in view, some are




cited are not also reconstructed, the recommended limited change
can produce only question and confusion.' 9
Other rules illustrate the development of an interpretative
gloss which conceals and even falsifies the original. A notable case
is that of the now famous rule on the effect of findings of fact, per-
haps the most cited rule of all. The provision was developed as a
statement of the equity rule of review, viz., "Findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses." 20 While the second clause is a broad hint to the
exercise of discretion, yet there is no question of the purpose to
make the "clearly erroneous" principle basic in all review as a
uniform and unifying principle, applicable whether "at law" or
"in equity," whether by deposition or by oral testimony.2 1 But
there soon developed an appellate gloss that, where the testimony
was by deposition, the appellate court was in as good a position as
the trier to pass on the testimony and hence could then more easily
find the trier in error.22 Next came the step of forgetting the rule
and substituting the gloss to make review in such cases substantial-
ly de novo.23 Finally one court set up a veritable hierarchy of seven
classes, involving different stages of review, thus destroying all uni-
formity to the basic principle, and inviting appeals beyond previous
practice.24 Other courts, an apparent minority, followed the origi-
19No complete documentation of this problem is attempted here; it is
touched upon in the Book Review cited in note 18 supra, as well as in Book
Review, 47 N. W. U. L. REv. 739 (1952). The Advisory Committee, to whom
the proposal has been referred, see REP. JuD. CoNi. or =un U. S. 23 (Sept.
22-24, 1952), is expected to report upon the matter shortly.20
RULE 52(a). For the background of this rule, see Advisory Committee's
Note to Rlrm 52 and Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. or Cmr. L.
REV. 190 (1937).21 See the Committee Note cited in note 20 supra, also 2 Commn ox
BAMMupry 965-966 (14th ed. by Moore & Oglebay 1940), quoting the note
from 3 MooRs's FmEsRA PRAcTIcE 3116 (1st ed. 1938); Clark, supra note 12, 3
VAws. L. REV. at 505-506 (1950).2 2 Among cases see Fleming v. Palmer, 123 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1941), cert
denied Carribean Embroidery Cooperative, Inc. v. Fleming, 316 U.S. 662(1942); Banister v. Solomon, 126 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1942); Ball v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948); Himmel Bros. Co. v. Serrick Corp.,
122 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1941); Smyth v. Barneson, 181 F.2d 143, 144 (9th Cir.
1950).2 3 See, e.g., Dollar v. Land, 184 F.2d 245 (D.C.Cir. 1950), cert. denied
Land v. Dollar, 340 U.S. 884 (1950); Panama Transport Co. v. The Maravi,
165 F.2d 719, 720 (2d Cir. 1948); Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 85(2d Cir. 1944); Bertel v. Panama Transport Co., 202 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir.
1953); Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 112 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1940).2 4 Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 538 (2d Cir. 1950), a 2-1 decision,
cert. denied 340 U.S. 810 (1950). See criticism in Comment, Scope of Ap-
pellate Fact Review Widened, 2 SrA. L. REV. 784, 787-788 (1950); approval in
5 MOOnE's FEsImAL PACTICzC § 52.04 (2d ed. 1951).
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nal mandate.25 If this view could now be re-enforced by a clarifying
amendment, this would not constitute a change, only more properly
a restoration of meaning, and the rules would be benefited by a re-
turn to the original purpose.26
Another example occurs in connection with the rules of waiver
of jury trial -rules basic to the fundamental code reform of the
union of law and equity. The principle is that jury trial is waived
by failure to make affirmative claim not later than 10 days after
the service of the last issue which a party desires so tried.27 Since
the rules, while eschewing throughout the mysticism of the old
"cause of action," yet always stress the factual nature of the claim
and find no different claim when, whatever the legal theory, there
is still involved "the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth" originally,28 an amendment after
waiver setting forth only a change of legal claim on the same oc-
currence would seem not adequate to overcome the waiver. Such
was the original view and tfiat followed in many precedents. 29 But
25 See, e.g., Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138
(8th Cir. 1950); Holt v. Werbe, 198 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1952); Jacuzzi Bros.,
Inc. v. Berkeley Pump Co., 191 F.2d 632, 637-638 (9th Cir. 1951); Quon v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co. ot New York 190 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1951); Yankwich,
Findings in the Light of the Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 8 F.RD. 271, 289.
26A clarifying amendment might conceivably take the course of sep-
arating the provision into two sentences, thus leaving the basic direction
without qualification, and making the latter provision more directory and
less mandatory in language.27 RULE 38(b) and (d). For the importance of this rule to the merger of
law and equity, see Advisory Committee's Note to RuL 38; James, Trial by
Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YAux L. . 1022 (1936);
CLARK, CODE PLnDIG 78, 90, 113-122 (2d ed. 1947).28The quoted language comes from Ruta 15(c), "Relation Back of
Amendments." The stress of the rules upon the factual basis of the claim
for relief, with complete elimination of the confusing phrase "cause of ac-
tion," is well recognized. See, e.g., Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 285
(1942); Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943).
2 9 See PROc=sINGs op NEW YORK SyWosrin (1938) 309, 310; Gulbenkian
v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 158 A.L.R. 990 (2d Cir. 1945); Fidelity & De-
posit Co. of Maryland v. Krout, 157 F.2d 912, 913 (2d Cir. 1946); Parissi v.
Foley, 203 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1953); Goldblatt v. Inch, 203 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1953); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 190 F.2d 234,
237 (10th Cir, 1951); Moore v. United States, 196 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1952).
See also cases sustaining waiver, even though a case begun in admiralty is
transferred to the "law" or civil side. United States ex rel. Pressprich &
Son Co. v. James W. Elwell & Co., 250 F. 939 (2d Cir. 1918), cert denied
Jones v. United States ex rel Pressprich & Son Co., 248 U.S. 564 (1918); James
Richardson & Sons v. Conners Marine Co., 141 F.2d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 1944);
United States v. The John R. Williams, 144 F.2d 451, 454 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
782 (1944).
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others now find a waiver in the new "cause of action" (sic) and
allow for example the dropping of a claim for injunction on a
patent infringement to revive the privilege of claiming jury trial.,30
Restoration of meaning by amendment to prevent the undercutting
of this basic rule by shrewd procedural manipulation would seem
desirable.8 ' As a last example I shall refer to the well known dif-
ference in approach to the summary judgment, where some courts
have cut it down in substance to the field of operation of the old
demurrer by substituting for the actual rule the devastating gloss
that if there is "the slightest doubt" as to the facts, the summary
judgment must be denied.3 2 A clarifying addition to the rule may
3OBereslavsky v. Kloeb, 162 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied Kloeb
v. Bereslavsky, 332 U.S. 816 (1947); Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied Caffey v. Bereslavsky, 332 U.S. 770 (1947); Canister
Co. v. Leahy, 191 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied Leahy v. Canister Co.,
342 U.S. 893 (1951); Nolan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 11 F!RD. 194
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). An amendment merely changing the nature of the relief
claimed is clearly unnecessary, Runs 54(c), and by the better practice should
not be allowed. See Couto v. United Fruit Co., 203 F.2d 456, 457 (2d Cir.
1953), with which compare Bereslavsky v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 7 F.RD.
444 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), which led through, id. 445 (1946) and 447 (1947), to
Bereslavsky v. Caffey, supra.31 This might take the form of providing as a part of RuLE 38(d) on
waiver that a waiver of jury trial would not be revoked or recalled by an
amendment of a pleading asserting only a claim or defense arising out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading.32 See, e.g., Doeher Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130
(2d Cir. 1945); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Peckham v.
Ronrico Corp., 171 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir. 1948). So mere pleading allega-
tions or denials have been held sufficient to prevent summary judgment
Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir.
1948); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 176 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1949); Hoffman v. Babbitt Bros. Trading Co., 203 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1953). See
Seaboard Surety Co. v. Racine Screw Cc., 203 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1953),
holding summary judgment unavailable in actions for specific performance;
but see contra, Dale v. Preg, 204 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1953); the New York
rule, N.Y.C.P.R. 113, and Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N. Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d
424 (1953); and the settled rule as to actions for injunction, Houghton Mifflin
Co. v. Stackpole & Sons Inc., 11 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v.
W. T. Grant Co. 345 U.S. 629, 635 (1953). Learned criticism of this re-
stricted approach is now too extensive to cite exhaustively; some of the ar-
ticles are cited in the writer's The Sumary Judgment, 36 M=qN. L. REv. 567
(1952); and see Yankwich, Summary judgment Under Federal Practice, 40
CAIav. L. REV. 204, 224 (1952); McAllister, Pre-Trial Practice in the Southern
District of New York, 12 F.R.D. 373, 378; Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment
Under the Federal Rules-When an Issue of Fact Is Presented, 51 ica. L.
REV. 1143 (1953); 99 U. OF PA. L. REV. 212 (1950); 5 VAND. L. REv. 607 (1952);
25 WASH. L. REv. 71 (1950). For a different approach see Zampos v. United
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 10th Cir., July 9, 1953; Brensinger v.
Margaret Ann Super Markets, 192 F2d 458 (5th Cir. 1951); Engl v. Aetna
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not change fundamental judicial attitudes, but it may at least show
the hoped-for direction. 33
It seems to me that these examples -and others which might
also be chosen 34 - not only illustrate the problem, but point pretty
definitely to the answer. If amendments to correct the arbitrary
interpretations indicated are not to be favored, then the rules are
at the mercy of the more inflexible interpreters and in any event
are destined to lose their value in time, as even natural interpre-
tation hardens. And the reason suggested, to prevent confusion in
state adoptions of the Federal Rules, operates to accentuate the
errors as leading to their perpetuation in state practice, either in
rules already adopted or in accepting the new procedure initially.
An illustration which comes to mind, perhaps as a converse side
of the picture, is that of the former federal conformity to state pro-
cedure at law which for a century was "static" conformity as of
periods of time long past.3 5 Here we have a suggested state con-
formity to not the best, perhaps the worst, of federal procedure
made rigid by unchangeable limiting rulings. So the hope of contin-
uing supervision of the rules by a standing committee is lost so far
as practical utility is concerned; indeed, the hope for flexibility in
Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943); Forde v. United States, 189 F2d
727 (1st Cir. 1951); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952); Griffin v.
Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 235 (1946); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 635 (1953); and see the recommendation of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, in its REPORT of Sept. 1948, pp. 36-37, for greater use
of the summary judgment.
33 Thus an amendment to RuLs 56(c) -which states the criterion of
"no genuine issue as to any material fact" -could make it clear that a re-
sponse to a motion and affidavits for summary judgment must be by equally
detailed answer under oath, and not by formal pleading denials or allegations.
34 Thus the entire section on discovery - Rums 26 to 37-seems par-
ticularly to invite a procedural gloss which will restrict trial court discretion.
Vor general discussions, see Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States
District Courts, 60 YALE L. J. 1132 (1951); Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse
of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L, J. 117 (1949); Yudkin,
Some Refinements in Federal Discovery Procedure, 11 ED. B. J. 289 (1951);
Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COL. L. Rv.
1026 (1950).
A recent striking example of judicial propensity to rewrite procedural
rules is Butcher & Sherrerd v. Welsh, 3d Cir., Aug. 5, 1953, importing into
the broad terms of RLnE 60(b) a requirement for its use of upper court per-
mission in any case where an appeal has been had. See In re Long Island
Lighting Co., 197 F.2d 709, 710 (2d Cir. 1952); S. C. Johnson & Son v. John-
son, 175 F.2d 176, 177, 184 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied 338 U.S. 860 (1949);
Perlman v. 322 West Seventy-Second Street Co., 127 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1942).
35 Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-IL The Background,
44 YALE L. J. 387 (1935); Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. Rsv. 504
(1935); Tolman, The Origin of the Conformity Idea, etc., 23 A.B.A.J. 971
(1937); CLMaM, CODE PEAinG 31-34 (2d ed. 1947).
[Vol. 14
"CLARIFYING" AMENDMENTS
procedure by court action as opposed to the rigidity of statutory
enactment is substantially gone.36 And the consequence defeats
the purpose; for state procedure, too, cannot be made forward look-
ing if it is to be bound by shackles of federal precedents. Much
better to put up to the states the thinking about procedure which
new federal amendments must suggest than the sterility of literal
acceptance of divinely ordered codes or rules perpetually to be
maintained so far as their language is concerned.3 7 What we should
hope for is a lively sense of procedural thinking among all lawyers
and judges; there is, there should be, no federal monopoly. The
thinking about procedure, the resolving of steps for its improve-
ment, is a vital part of rulemaking not only for actual achievement,
but for the stimulus it provides. Let us have live rules committees,
both state and national! And may each stimulate the other to great-
er endeavors in a spirit of mutual co-operation. 38
That is why, in this writer's opinion, clarifying amendments
must be recommended or the rulemaking process becomes sterile
and dead. That is why we should welcome the efforts, from what-
ever source, but most of all from sources of official responsibility
in rulemaking, to improve the workings of courts and the adminis-
tration of justice.
3 6 Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Courts Federal Rules
Committee, 28 AEB.A.J. 521 (1942); Clark, supra note 12, 3 VAmN. L. REV. at
507, 508 (1950); 3 MooaR's FEDERAL PRAcTcE 3453 (Ist ed. 1938); PaREnuNARY
DRAFT, supra note 2 at 170, 171; REPoRT (April 1937), supra note 2 at vii;
Resolution of the American Bar Association, 28 A.B-.AJ. 711 (1942); see
CAxmozo, LAw An LT=ATURE, A Ministry of Justice, supra note 13 at 41;
Sunderland, The Machinery of Procedural Reform, 22 MYcH. L. REv. 404 (1924).
37Actually literal conformity is not only undesirable, but impossible in
any realistic adaptation of federal principles to local conditions. Thus, in states
well devoted to these principles, deviations in at least minor degrees must
appear: some 21 modifications and 8 new rules in Arizona; some 27 vari-
ances in Minnesota; and slightly more in Utah. See, 1 FEmm RULES DIGEST
vii (1949); id. xii, xv, Cum. Supp. (1953).
38 The use of state adaptations in future federal rules amendments is
thus to be expected; the Advisory Committee has under consideration such
material in connection with, e.g., RULES 14(a), 23(d), 30(b), 35(a) and (b),
50(b) and (c), and 56(c). See, in general, Wright, Moderm Pleading and the
Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. oF PA. L. RrV. 909, 944-947 (1953).
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